Finland’s Accession to NATO Improves the Military Security Situation in the Baltics, But Suwalki Gap Remains a Problem to Be Solved
Here is a quick explainer, how the infamous Suwalki Gap still plays into the region’s #EnergySecurity
Who dis? See here:
To start us of, here’s my jumping off point:
Lukas Trakimavičius of ENSECCOE, on the increasing role of the Baltic Sea in Lithuania‘s energy security.
Recap: region’s plans to go green mean massive offshore wind developments. What is more region made a hard pivot from piped gas from Russia to relying on LNG infrastructure that is also serviced by sea. And so securing the Baltic Sea is becoming paramount to region’s energy security.
Mart Kuldkepp of UCL, on the implications of Finland‘s accesion to NATO.
Recap: Finland and Sweden joining NATO means a unified Scandinavian, Baltic and Polish security space. In it Kaliningrad becomes less useful to Russia and Suwalki Gap problem is „eliminated“. Region’s security interests get more clout and serve as a counterweight to less hawkish Western allies.
Gen. Ben Hodges, on things Lithuania should be doing politically to defend itself.
Recap: there is a lot of work to be done by Lithuania to fulfill its NATO Article 3 obligations. Including training reserves, cooperation with neighbors, interoperability of forces and rail infrastructure.
Since I am not an expert on rail or military logistics I will leave Rail Baltica mostly out of this note. But I have very few good things to say about the way this project is progressing. The best of which would be that it has ample room for improvement. The railway line inevitably will go via Suwalki Gap though.
I do agree with most things these kind people have said. But I would like to put a finer point on one thing in this virtual discussion.
There is still a lot of stuff happening in the Suwalki Gap that will remain an energy security risk for the coming ~decade.
Suwalki Gap (marked in purple) and NATO - Russia boder (orange).
Here are some of those things.
Power System
Baltics are on their way to switch from operating in the Russian IPS/UPS power system to European UCTE grid.
That connection will happen over a power line from Lithuania to Poland called LitPol Link. That is a single overhead power line that crosses the Suwalki Gap. This puts staying connected to Europe at risk in case of a kinetic attack.
The situation might be somewhat improved once Harmony Link, an undersea HVDC cable comes online. But only marginally since it can only offload power trading flows off of LitPol Link. What is more, this project is only bound to be finished in 2027-2028.
This would not be an issue if Baltic power systems were rock solid or at least close to that. However. According to current estimates LOLE, a measure of system adequacy, in Lithuania is bound to jump far above acceptable limits after 2025. This will be mitigated by refurbishing older gas powered units.
As well as Estonian power generators’ exposure to Russian political risk the LOLE situation serves as an illustration of this: in my view there still is some distance left to cover until the Baltics can be confident in their ability to maintain power system operations outside the IPS/UPS system in face of disruptions while not enduring excessive economic strain.
There is more. Once Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are ready to connect their power systems to mainland Europe, there will be an issue with Kaliningrad. Brussels will be dealing with Moscow regarding the future of the Kaliningrad’s power system. So far Russia has not indicated any specific wishes about the future operating mode between UCTE Lithuania and IPS/UPS Kaliningrad. Be sure it will come in late and loud.
How do we eliminate this risk?
Ensure Baltic power system is solid. This will take a lot of work and money and I would not expect all the necessary projects to come online sooner than, say, 2032. Regional perspective is a bit murky because so far there is little real clarity on what the Baltic power system will look like in the end.
Kaliningrad is a different kind of problem and relates to wider security concerns. It is first and foremost a weapons depo and a firing position for Russia’s armed forces inside Europe. This risk can only be handled by deterrence.
Transit of goods by rail to Russia’s exclave is a major escalation risk. Not only it is a ready-made excuse for any kinetic action in the Suwalki Gap region. Last summer we witnessed that the transit issue can flare up even if Russia and the West get into a scuffle far away from the Suwalki Gap. There is no reason to think transit of gas and power would be any different.
Therefore I would rather we cut all transit and interconnections – rail, power and gas – off. It cannot be done all at once but current reduction of trade is a serious step towards that. We probably should be working to keep current restrictions indefinately and look for ways to move forward. It would be a difficult position to hold because it would probably be considered overly hawkish by our allies further West.
The Pipeline
Issues of security of gas supply in the region are mostly solved. But since we are talking Suwalki Gap, we must at least touch upon it.
Two FSRU units (floating gas import terminals) – one in Klaipeda, Lithuania & one in Inkoo, Finland, – and an underground storage in Latvia provide ample security of supply for the region.
There also is a lifeline to Europe, a gas interconnection between Lithuania and Poland, GIPL. It currently serves to supply the Polish market with gas via Klaipeda.
This pipeline is dug in and this makes it less exposed to kinetic damage. Less exposed does not mean invulnerable. But all of it is far less of an issue due to sufficient gas supply alternatives on both sides of the pipeline.
It still can be lit like a rather large torch though.
In case You are wondering, why is this posted on an obscure personal website – it is because I do this on my own spare time. I only have enough of it to write this and not to deal with the rest of it.
Ideas? Reach out via LinkedIn or Twitter (links above).